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BRUNSWICK LAND CORPORATION 
v. 
C. H. PERKINSON 
Record 598 
FBOM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BRUNSWICK COUNTY, VIRGINIA, 
"The briefs shall be printed in type not less in size than 
small pica, and shall be nine inches in length and six inches 
in width, so as to conform in dimC'nsions to / the printed 
records along with which they are to be bound, in accord-
ance with Act of Assembly, approved March 1, 1903; and 
the clerks of this court are directed not to receive or file a 
brief not conforming in all respects to the aforementioned 
requirements.'' 
The foregoing is printed in small pica type for the infor-
mation of counsel. 
H. STEW ART JONES, Clerk. 
IN THE 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia 
AT RICHMOND. 
BRUNSWICK LAND CORPORATION 
v. 
C. H. PERKINSON. 
To the Honorable Judges of the Supre1ne Cou,rt of Appeals 
of Virgmia: 
Your petitioner, Brunswick Land Corporation, with its 
principal office in the Town of Lawrenceville, Virginia1 re-
spectfully represents that it is aggrieved by a final judgment 
of the Circuit Court for the County of Brunswick rendered 
on the 28th da.y of January, 1928, in an action at law under 
the style of Brunswick Land Corporation v. C. H. Perkinson, 
wherein your petitioner was the plaintiff, by which judg-
ment the said Court .sustained a plea of the statute of limi-
tations interposed by the defendant. A transcript of the 
record of the judgment complained of is herewith presented 
and made a part of this petition. 
STATEl\iENT OF ~HE CASE. ~ 
As disclosed by the pleadings and the supplemental agree-
ment between counsel, ti1e facts a~e as follows: 
Prior to ,June 5th, 1922~ plaintiff, Brunswick Land Corpo-
ration, and defendant, C. H. Perkinson, were adjacent land 
owners in Brunswick County, Virgi;nia. The defendant. C. 
H. Perkinson, crossed over the line of Brunswick Land Cor-
poration and cut from the lands of the said Brunswick Land 
Corporation the timber ment"ioned in the notice of motion in 
·this proceeding. Upon demand for payment, the said de-
fendant, C. II. Perkinson, denied having crossed the line and 
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cut the timber of the plaintiff, Brunswick . Land Corpora-
. tion. Thereupon, on the 5th day of June, 1922, Brunswick 
Land Corporation instituted a proceeding ~n the Circu;it 
Court for Brunswick County, Virginia, ·against the said C. 
H. Perkinson by petition pursuant to Section 5490 of the 
Code of ·v'irginia, for the purpose of having the true boundary 
line between the said Brunswick Land Corporation and the 
defendant, C. H. Perkinson determined and ascertained. The 
defendant, C. H. Perkinson, in his grounds of defense to the 
said _petition, denied that the plaintiff, Brunswiek· Land Cor-
poration, had any legal title to the land claimed by the plain-
tiff and adjoining the lands of the said de.fendant. 
·On the 7th day of :Nlarch, 1924, upon a trial of the said case 
before the Circuit Court for Brunswiek County, Virginia, a 
jury rendered a verdict establishing the said line between 
Brunswick Land Corporation and C. H. Perkinson in accord-
flnce with the contention of Brunswick Land Corporation. 
'rhereupon, the defendant, C. H. Perkinson, by counsel, moved 
the Circuit Court for Brunswick County, Virginia, to set 
aside the verdiet of the jury, and enter up judgment in his 
favor; and on the 7th day of May, 1924, upon a hearing on 
the said motion. the Circuit Court for Brunswick County, 
Virginia, set aside and annulled the verdict of the jury, and 
entered up final judgment for the defendant, C. H .. Perkinson, 
thereby sustaining the contention and defense· of the said C. 
H. Perkinson in said proceeding, to the effect that Bruns-
wick Land Corporation had no legal and valid title to the 
land from 'vhich the said timber had been cut. 
On the 4th day of August, 1924, the Supreme Court of Ap-
peals of ·virginia granted a writ of error a.nd awarded a 
.~?t.per.c;edea,,q to the judgment of the Circuit Court for· Bruns-
wick County, Virginia, rendered on the 7th day of May, 1924, 
as aforesaid. On the 30th day of April, "1926, the Special 
Court of Appeals of Virginia (see Bruns·w·ick Land Corpora-
tion vs. Perkitison, 132 S. E., page 853), upon a hearing of the 
said writ of error reversed the judgment of the Cireuit Court 
for Brunswick County, Virginia, and remanded the said cause 
to the Circuit Court for Brunswick County, Virginia, with 
direetion to enter up a judgment in aceorda.nee with the ver-
dict of the jury, thereby holding that the said plaintiff had a 
leg-al title to the premises in. question. 
Immediately after the rendition of the judgment of the 
Special Court of Appeals of Virginia, as aforesaid, immedi-
ate demands were. again made upon the said C. H. Perkin-
son by Brunswick Land Corporation for payment for the 
---- ---
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timber which the said C. H. Perkinson had 'vrongfully cut 
and t!\ken from the premises of Brunswick Land Corporation. 
Negotiations for settlement of the matter pended until the 
7th day of April, 1927, when Brunswick Land Corporation in-
stituted in the Circuit Court for B~unswick County, Virginia, 
a notice of motion for judgment against the said C. H. Per-
kinson, in the amount of $2,000.00, seeking in the said notice 
the recovery of this amount for the timber which had been 
cut and removed by C. H. Perkinson from the lands of the 
said Brunswick Land Corporation, as aforesaid. 
To this proceeding, among other defenses, the defendant, 
C. H. Perkinson, on April 13th, 1927, filed a plea of the stat-
ute of limitations. Before going into a trial of the said cause, 
before a jury on its merits, it· was agreed between counsel 
in the case to submit to the Circuit Court for Brunswick 
County, Virginia, as a preliminary question, whether or not 
the statute of limitations was a bar to the action, on the 
facts as stated in the pleadings and the supplemental agree-
ment between counsel, all of which are a part of the record in 
this case. On J_anuary 28th, 1928, the Circuit Court for 
Brunswick County, Virginia, entered a final judgment in this 
cause sustaining the defendant's plea of the statute of limi-
tations, to which action of the Court the plaintiff, Bruns-
w'ick l;and Corpoa.rtion, by counsel, excepted, as is disclosed 
by the final order in this cause. 
THE QUESTION INVOLVED. 
It will be observed that the only and sole issue involved on 
this appeal is as to the sufficiency of the plea of the statute of 
limitations on the part of the defendant. In this connection 
it bec{)mes necessary to determine, in the first instance, the 
time at which the cause of action as set forth in the plain-
tiff's notice of motion actually accrued, under the facts in 
thi"s ease. In the second place, in order to reach a proper 
conclusion in this cause, it may become necessary after having 
decided when the cause of action accrued and the statute of 
limitations commenced to run, whether or not there has been 
any suspension or interruption of the statute. 
In view of the fact that the defendant, C. ·H. Perkinson, 
when demands were first made upon him for payment for the 
timber which he had wrongfully cut and removed from the 
premises of the plaintiff, denied that he had been upon the 
premises of the plaintiff, and further denied that plaintiff 
had any legal title to the land in question, it became neces-
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sary, as plaintiff vie,ved. the matter, to have some judicial 
determination of the facts as a prerequisite to the institution 
of the notice of motion to recover the value of the timber so 
cut and removed, if any. In fact, the substance of the pro-
ceeding under section 5490 of the Code instituted under date 
of June 5th, 1922, by the plaintiff against the defendant for 
the purpose of having the true boundary line between the 
plaintiff and the defendant ascertained was in effect the same 
as the notice of motion for judgment, now pending, as this 
former proceeding had as its ultimate purpose and objee-
tive, a recovery of damages from the defendant for the un-
warranted trespasses which he had perpetrated against the 
plaintiff, Brunswick Land CC?rpora.tion. 
''Institution of a suit of kindred nature to the one in con-
troversy which must necessarily. determine the merits of the 
latter suit and which is brought for that purpose may, in 
Rome cases, be taken as an institution of the second suit to the 
extent that it will arrest the running of the statute as to the 
latter. The application of this rule, however, is strictly con-
fined to the cases within its meaning.,., 37 Corpus Juris, 
page 1053. · 
''."\Vhere the right to sue, to resort to the particular remedy, 
or to proceed against particular persons depends upon the 
prior ascertainment of facts or the establishment of particu-
lar conditions upon which the peculiar liability may be en-
forced, the running of the statute begins from the ascertain-
ment of such facts, or the establishment of such conditions, 
and not until then.'' See 37 Corpus Juris, page 955, and cases 
there cited. 
''Trover, being the proper remedy for the wrongful conver-
sion or appropriation of the property of anotl1er, undoubtedly 
includes appropriations by theft, as 'veil as by fraud and tres-
pass, unless there is some ·Special rule of public policy that 
excludes them. There is none such; but it has often been 
held, for the sake of public justice, that the private action of 
Trover is suspended, until the public prosecution fOT the of-
fense has been duly conducted and ended." H~ttchinson v . 
.. 11. d!; Pt1. Bank of TVheeling, 41 Penn. State, page 42; 80 
American Decisions, page 596. 
In the foregoing case the defendant 's· plea of the statute of 
limitations was of no nvail inasmuch as the action was insti-
tuted within the statutory period of six years from the date 
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of the criminal prosecution and not from the date of the theft. 
or conve-rsion. It would, therefore, seem from this author-
ity, had the plaintiff in the instant case seen fit to prosecute 
the defendant for the theft of the timber in question, th~ atat-
ute of limitations would not have commenced to run untH 
such prosecution had ended. 
It has been repeatedly held that the right .of a succ~ssful 
contestant, in an election contest, to recover from the iucum.,. 
bent the emoluments of the office, is not barred by limitation, 
so long as the action is instituted within the statutory p~~·iod 
following a final determination of the plaintiff's right to such 
office. The statute of limitations in such cases comm~nces to 
run, not from the receipt of the emoluments, but from the time 
tha.t the office is dec.lared to rig-htfully belong· to the C:Oll-
testant. Bowen vs. Lovewell, 119 Ark. 64, 177 S. 'vV. 929; 
[( re-itz vs. Behrensnwyer, 149 Ill. 496; 24: L. R. A. 59. 
In view of the foregoing it is respectfully submitted that 
in the instant case the plaintiff's cause of action did not ac-
crue and the Statute of Limitations did not commence to run 
ag·ainst the same until the 30th day of April, 1926, when the 
Special Court of Appeals of Virginia finally determined that 
the plaintiff, Brunswick Land Corporation~ had legal title to 
tlu~ land upon which the timber in question was situate. 
\Ve come now to deal with the question as to whether or not 
the statute of limitations has been suspended, interrupted o:r 
tolled, assuming that the cause of action as set forth in the 
notice of motion accrued to the plaintiff and that the stat- . 
ute commenced to run upon the completion of the cutting and 
removal of the timber.· On this phase of the case we earn-
estly submit that under no aspect of the case should that pe-
riod of time beh\reen the 7th day of ~:lay, 1924, and the 30t1J 
day of April, 1926, he computed against the plaintiff in de-
termining whether or not this cause is barred by the statute 
of limitations. And at this jnnc.tnre may we be permitted · 
to state that if this interval, viz.: from l\lay 7th, 1924, to April 
:30th, 1.926, he eliminated, .or he not counted, then this action 
was instituted in due time, and the plaintiff should prevail 
on this appenl. Upon a reference to the agreement between 
counsel it will he seen that this was one of the specific qne8-
tions submitted to the trial court, and the court reached a con-
clusion adverse to the contentions of plai)1tiff. 
It will he remembered that in the proceeding under section 
5490 of the Code plaintiff, Brunswick Land Corporation, on 
Mnrch 7t.h, 1924, obtajned before a jury in the Circuit Court 
for Brunswick County, Virginia, a fa,Torable verdict whh .. h 
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·not only established the true boundary line between th~ plain~ 
tiff and defendant, but at the same time put at rest for the 
time being all question as to the Yalidity of the title of the 
plaintiff which had been assailed by the defendant. Under 
the~e circumstances plaintiff ""as in a position and could have 
forthwith instituted its action against the defendant to re-
cover for the timber which had been taken by the defendant. 
rrhere would have been, at that time, no impediment nor bar 
to such a proceeding·. But on the 7th clay of May, 1924, the 
Circuit Court for Brunswick County, Virginia, at the in-
stance of the defendant, set aside and a1mulled the verdict 
of the jury, and without even ordering a new trial, proceeded 
further to enter up final j1idgment for the defendant, thereby 
in effect deciding that the disputed area, from which the tim-
her was cut, belonged to the defendant or some other person, 
Rnd that tl1e plaintiff had no title nor interest in the same. 
This was a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction and 
was, of course, operative against the plaintiff until the 30th 
day of April, 1926, when this judgment was reversed by the 
Special Court of Appeals, and the plaintiff was, by the said 
~onrt, declared to haYe a valid title to the disputed area in 
qneRtion, from which the timber was cut. D·urin.g this pe-
rif)d of tune the cou.rfs of the Connnonwealth of Virginia were 
(!7.o8erl. to the tJlaintijf sn far as the -institttttion of ·any action 
for +his tresJJass was concerned. A paramount authority, 
in fact,' the' very court in whicll plaintiff was compelled to 
have instituted his action, has, during· the above periop, sa.id 
the plaintiff was not the owner of the property against which 
the trespass had been committed_, and for that reason no ac-
tion could have been maintained. The matter was in effect 
res arl}rudica-ta until this judgment 'vas. ultimately reversed. 
"\Vhere the character of the legal proceeding is sucl1 that 
the law restrains one of the parties from exercising a legal 
remedy against another, the running· of the statute of limi-
tations applicable to the remedy is postponed, or, if it has 
comn1encecl to run, is suspended, during the time tlw :restraint 
incident to the proceedh1g continues." 17 R. C. L. 870; 
Hutchison vs. Hu.tch:ison, 92 Kan. 518, 52· L. R. A. (N. S.) 
1165. 
~rhe case of Hu.tch,ison. vs. Hu~chison, sutJra,, is apparently 
H well considered case and on account of its analogy to the 
instant case we take· the liberty .to quote at. length from 
this case as follows: 
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''That the running of the statute of limitations may be 
postponed, or may b'e suspended after it has commenced to 
run, for causes not specified in the statute, is well es-
tablished. ~rhe basis of such exceptions ""as well stated by 
~ir. Justice Strong· in the case of Unifed States vs. Wiley, 11 
Wall. 508, 20 L. Ed. 211, 213: 'In H a·nger vs. Abbott, 6 "\Vall. 
582, 18 L. JiJd. ·939, it was decided that the effect of the war 
was to stop the running- of the statute of limitations during 
its continuance, ·in suits between the inhabitants of the loyal 
states and the inhabitants of those in rebellion. The same 
doctrine was repeated in substance in the Protector. It would 
ans"rer no good purpose to go behind the decisions and re-
view the reasons upon which they are founded. We are sti11 
of the opinion that they rest upon sound principle. But it 
is said these decisions Oilly rule that tl1e war suspended the 
statutes running against claims by one citizens upon another, 
and that tl1ey do not relate to claims of the gqvernment. 
against its own citizens resident in rebellious states. ·This 
may he coneedecl; hut the same reasons .which justify tl1e ap-
plication of the rule to one class of cases require its applica-
tion to tl1e other. True, the right of a sitizen to sue durin~ 
the continum1ce of the war "ras· suspended, while the right. 
of the government remained unimpaired. But it is the loss 
of the ability to sue~ rather than tl1e loss of tl1e right, that 
stops the running· of the statute. .The inability may arise 
from the. snspei)Sion of a right or from the closing. of the 
courts; hut, whatever the original cause, the proximate and 
operative reason is that the claimant is deprived of the power 
to institute his suit.. Statutes of limitations are indeed stat-
utes of repose. They are enacted upon the presumption 
that one having a well founded claim will not delay enforeing 
it heyond a reasonable time, if he has the power to sue. Snrh 
reasona hie time is therefore defined and allowed. But the 
basis of the presumption is gone whenever the ability to re-
sort to the courts l1as l1een taken awaY .. In such a case the 
creditor l1as not the time within which. to bring his suit tlwt 
tlw statute contemplated he slwuld haYe,' p. 513. * * ,, 
"Sometimes it is said that the rule excluding from compu-
tation the time during- whieh a r.reditor is prevented hv para-
mount authority from exereising his remedy applies only 
when the paramount authority "ra.s inYokecl and the restraint. 
wns induced hv the debtor. This statement of the rnk 
( Lar.r1et·1na11 vs: Casserly. 107 ~finn. 491, 23 L. R .. A. (N. S.) 
673, 131 Am. St. Rep. 506) is too hroad, since the paramon~1 
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authority might, under some circumstances, be the state it-
self acting in its sovereign capacity." 
"It has bemi declared that the specification by the legis-
iat.ure of exceptions to the operation of the general statute 
of limitations will not preelndc the court from applying ex-
ceptions to such statute which 'vere recognized by the com-
mon law othet· than those prescribed by the. statute. In line 
with this view it has been said that there is one class of cases 
wh~ch is excluded from the operation of the statute l?y act 
of la'v itself, which class embraces those cases in which no 
action can he brought at all, either for want of parties capa-
ble of suing, or because the law prohibits the bringing of an 
. action. In sucl1 cases the generalla"r operates as a qualifica-
tion, or tacit condition of the particular statute. 17 R. C. L. 
829; Braun vs. Sauerwe-in, 10 \Vall. 218, 19 U. S. (L. Ed.) 
89!1: Crt:rrier vs. Chica .. qo, etc., R. Co., 79 Ia.. 80, 6 L. R. A. 799. 
St(~ele vs. Bliss, et al., 166 niich. 593; 37 L. R. A. (.N. S.) 859.'' 
In the case of Brau·m vs. Sa.1terwein, su.pra, Mr. Justice 
S.trong-, speaking for the court said: "It seems, therefore, to 
be established that the running of a. statute of limitations 
may he suspended by ranses not mentioned in the statue it-
self.'' Thi~ proposition of law is affirmed and quoted in an 
opinion b~.,. nir .. Justice Bradley in the case of A1n~1 'vs. Wate1·-
tnum, 130 U. S. 320; 37 L. Eel. 95:3; 9 Sup.· Ct. Rep. 537, of 
whieh the court said: "':rhere is one class of cases \vhich is 
exrlnded from the operation of the statute by act of la\v it- , 
Relf. of which the case in which Mr. Justice Strong made the 
remark referred to is one. This class embraces the cases in 
which no action can be in·ought at. all, either for \vant of par-
ties capable of suing, or because the law prohibits the bring·-
ing of ~n action. In such cases the law operates as a quali-
fication, or tacit condition of the particular statute. * * * 
BoRides this general exeeption created hy act of la\v, it is dif-
ficult to find any other ground or cause .for suspending the 
statute not specified in the act itself." 
Ree a1$o Broadfoot ·vs. City of Fayetteville .• 124 N. C. 478; 
:i2 S .. E. 805, in ,,.,.hieh ease the foregoing authorities were 
(';~ted, affirmed and followed. 
In the case of Steele YS. Bliss, supra, it was held that an 
injunction suspends the operation of a statute of limitations 
:riot.withstancling the fac.t that this was not one of the excep .. 
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tions specified in the statute, the court saying: ''The .weight 
of authority holds that the running of the statute is inter-
rupted by an injunction. A few states. hold tfi the contrary. 
In the instant case the parties are by process of law pro-
hibited from acting, and it is clearly within the class of cases 
pointed Ol~t in the authorities cited." · 
In 17 R. C. L.,. pag~ 875, it is said: "It would be unreason-
able and inconsistent for the law to present to a party, in one 
l1and, a command to do an act within a certain time, ur~rler the 
penalty of losing his rights, and 'vi th the other hand restrain 
him from doing the act." See also 1Vakefield vs: Brown, 38 
Minn. 361; 37 N. W. 788; 8 A. S. R .. 671. 
''An action is said to be pei1eling so far as suspending the 
statute is concerned, until the final disposition of the appeal. 
So an appeal which suspends the right to recover possessio~l 
of land has been held to. stay the running of the statute 
against an action to recover rents and profits pending such 
appeal. And as a cause of action cannot be ·saiq to have ac-
crued until an action. can be instituted thereon, when the 
regularity of the proceedings for the condemnation of land, 
as w·ell as the amount of the damages clue the owner, is pend-
ing on appeal, he cannot bring an independent action for such 
damages. Similarly, if while one person claims public land 
under a gra~1t, another goes into possession thereof, and aft~r 
denial of his application to enter it as a homestead keeps the 
matter· in litigation by successtive appeals in the land depart-
ment of the United States for a long period and until it is 
decided against him, such time is not to be conted against the 
grantor in determining whether the statute of limitations 
has barred his right to the land, and whether his adversary 
has established title thereto hy. adverse possession."· 17 R . 
. C. L. 876; Notes, 4 Ann. Cas. 150; Ann. Cas. 1912D-1023. 
In c.onclusion your petitioner respectfully submits ti.t.~t it 
has not been given the time prescribed and contemplated by 
. the statute for the institution of this action; tha.t a portion of 
this time, to-wit: from l\fny 7th, 1924, to ... \.pril 30th, 192b, l1as 
been wrested from petitioner by a superior power and a para-
mount authority,-the operation of the la'v itself, without an~ 
fault on the part of :ronr petitioner. It is submitted that 
the trial court erred in sustaini11g, the plea of the statute of 
limHations on the part of the defendant, and in computii1g 
against the plaintiff, the ·period as aforesaid,_ during· which 
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time the plaintiff w·as in effect restrained from instituting 
this action. 
For the foregoing· and other errors apparent upon the rec.-
.ord, your petitioner prays a writ of error and supersedeas 
to the judgment complained of, and that the said judgment 
may lJe reviewed, reversed and remanded to the Circuit Court 
for Brunswick County, for a trial upon the merits of the 
case. · 
BR.UNS\YICI< LAND CORPORATION, 
By L. J. HAl\Il\I.ACI{, 
A. S. HARRISON, Jr., Counsel. 
. I, L. J. Hammack, an attorney at la'v practicing in the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of ·virginia, do certify that, in 
m~· opinion, tlw judgment complained of in the foregoing 
petition should lJe reviewed and reversed. . 
Given under my hand this the ·23 day of July, 1928. 
L. J. liAivi~LL\..CIC, Attorney. 
\Vrit. of error allowed and supersedeas aw·arded. Bond 
$:~00.00. 
JESSE F. \VEST. 
;J nly 23, 1928. 
Recei~red July 25, 1928. 
H. S. J. 
VIRGINIA: 
Pleas a.t the Court House of the 0ounty of Brnnsw·ick, 
before the Circuit Court for tl1e said County at the October 
Term. 1927, continued and held on the 28th day of tTann-
ary, 1928. 
Be it. remembered, that heretofore to-wit, on the 7th day of 
. April 1927 came Brunswick Land Corporation and filed its 
Notice of 1\fotion for .Judgment against C. I-I. Perkinson 'vhich 
is in the following words and figures to-,vit: 
Brunswick Land Corporation, Plaintiff, 
vs. 
C. H. Perkinson, Defendant. 
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NO'l1IGE OF MOTION FOR JUDGMENT. 
To C. H. Perkinson. 
You are hereby notified that Brunswick. Land Corpora-
tion, a corporation duly chartered and doing business under 
the la,vs of the State of Virginia, with its principal office at 
Lawrenceville, Virginia, will move the. Circuit Court for 
Brunswick County Virginia, at the Court House, on Tues-
day, April 26th, 1927, at t~n o'clock A. l\L, on that day, or as 
soon thereafter as counsel can conveniently be heard, for a 
judgment and a ward of execution against you in the amount 
of T·wo '11HOUSAND ($2,000.00) DOLLARS, with interest 
from March lst2 1920, which said amount is due the under-
signed by you for the following reasons, to-,vit: 
COUNT 1. 
That heretofore, to-wit: on the 1st day of ~Iarch, 1920, the 
said Brunswick Land Corporation was lawfully possessed as 
of their own property all of certain lands, and thereon certain 
standing timber, .felled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, 
Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, to-,vit: said tract 
of land lying and being in Sturgeon Magisterial District, 
Brunswick .County, ·virginia and Belfield Magisterial Dis-
trict, Greens ville County, ·virginia, known as the ''Bingham 
rrract'' and containing five hundred eleven and one-half 
(5lllf:!) acres, more or less, and being the same land conveyed 
to the said Brunswick Land Corporation by deed 
page 2 ~ of W. T. Harding apd wife, dated l.farch 19th, 1919, 
and of record in the clerk's office of BrunsWick 
County, Virginia, in Deed Book 71 a.t page 29:3, to which said 
deed reference is hereby made for a. more complete descrip-
tion of the said property, and thereon was situated, as afore-
said, a quantity of standing Timber, felled Timber, Log·s, 
Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, 
all of the same consisting of 20,500 feet of Pine Timber; 530 
vVhite Oak Ties; 65 R,ed Oak Ties; 42 IIickory Ties; and a 
great quantity of other Timber; all of great value, to-wit: 
of the value of $2,000.00. And l1eing so possessed, the said 
plaintiff Brunswick Land Corporation, afterwards, to-wit: 
on the day, month and year first above mentioned, lost and 
was deprived of the said standing Timber, felled Timber, 
Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chat-
tels, out of its possession, and the same afterwards, to-wit: 
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on the day, month and year aforesaid, and on numerous days 
thereafter, were taken into the possession of the defendant, 
C. H. Perkinson, by conversion. 
Yet the said defendant, C. 1-I. Perkinson, 'Yell knowing the 
said standing Trees, felled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, 
Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, to he the property 
of the said plaintiff, Bruns,vick Land Corporation, and of 
right to belong and appartain to it, contriving and fraudulent 
intending to deceive and defraud the said plaintiff in its be-
half, hath not delivered to the said plaintiff the said stand-
ing Timber, feiled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, 
Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, or any or either of them, or 
any part thereof, althougl1 often thereunto requested; and 
aftewards, to-wit: on the day, month and yeax aforesaid, con-
verted and disposed of the said standing Timber felled Tim-
ber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and 
Chattels to his own use, to the damage of the said plaintiff 
of $2,000.00. · 
COUNT 2. 
And for this, to..:wit: that heretofore, to-wit: on the first 
day o'f March, 1920, the said plaintiff, Brunswick 
page 3 ~ Land Corporation ,·,;ras lawfully possessed as of its 
p1·ope1·ty, of certain lands, a.nd thereon certain 
f-~tancling ,Timber, fe1led Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, 
Boards, ·'l'ies, Posts, ·Goods and Chattels, to-wit: a certain 
tract o'.f land lying and ·being in Sturgeon Magisterial Dis-
trict, Brunswick County, Virginia, and Belfield Magisterial 
Di~r;trict, Greensviile County, Virginia, containing 5111;2 
aeres, .more or less, known as. the ''Bingham Tract'' and be-
ing the same land conveyed to the said Brunswick Land Cor-
poration .by deed of W. T. I-Ia.rding and wife, dated Niarch 
19th, 1919. and of record in the Clerk's Office of Brunswick 
County, Virginia, in ·Deed Book .71 at page 293, to which said 
deed reference is hereby made for a more complete descrip-
tion of the said (propetty; and thereon standing Timber, 
·felled Timber, L{)gs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, 
Goods and Chattels, all the same consisting of 20,500 feet of 
·pjne Timber; ·530 White Oak 1~ies; 65 Red Oak Ties; 42 
Ilickory Ties.; and a large quantity of other timber, all of 
great value, to~,vit: of the value of $2,000;00. And being· 
so possessed thereof, the said plaintiff, Brunswick Land Cor-
poration. afterw·ards, to-wit: on the first day ·of March, 1920, 
an~l on divers days thereafter, before the commencement of 
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this motion, casually lost the said goods and chattels out of 
its possession, and the same afterwards, to-wit: on the day, 
days, month and year last aforesaid, were taken and carried 
away by the said defendant. 
Yet the said defendant, 'veil lo1owing the said standing 
Timber, felled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, ries, 
Posts, Goods and Chattels, to be the property of the said 
plaintiff, Brunswick Land Corporation, and of the right to 
belong and appertain to it, hath not as yet delivered the said 
last mentioned goods and chattels, or any or either of them, 
or any part thereof to the said plaintiff, although he was 
afterwards, to-,vit: on the day· and year last aforesaid ·and 
on numerous occasions thereafter, requested by the plaintiff 
to do so, but hath hitherto 'vholly refused and still doth de-
tain the same from the said plaintiff, to the dam-
page 4 ~ age of the said plaintiff in the sum of $2,000.00. 
COUNT 3. 
And for this, also,· to-wit: that heretofore to-,vit: 'on the 
first da.y of March, 1920, the aforesaid plaintiff, Brunswick 
.Land Corporation, was lawfully possessed as of its own prop-
erty; of certain lands, and th~reon certain standing rrimber, 
felled Timber Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, 
Goods and Chattels, to-wit: a certain tract of land lying and 
being in Sturgeon ~Iagisterial District, Brunswick County, 
Virginia, and Belfield Magisterial District, Greenville County, 
Virginia, containing 511% acres, more or less, known as the 
''Bingham Traet '' and being the same land conveyed to 
Brunswick Land Corporation by deed of W. T. Harding and 
wife, dated ~larch 19th, 1919, and of record in the Clerk's 
Office of Brunswick County, Virginia, in Deed Book 71, at 
page 293, to which said deed reference is hereby made for a 
more complete description of the said property; and thereon 
standing- rl,imher, felled Timher, L<>gs, Lumber, Planks, 
BoardR, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, all of the same con-
sisting of 20,500 feet of Pine Timber; 530 White Oak Ties; 
65 Red Oak Ties; 42 Hickory Ties; and a grea.t quantity of 
other Timber, all of great value, to-,vit: of the valne of $2.-
000.00 as of its own property. And being so possessed 
thereof, the said plaintiff afterwards, to-wit: on the first 
day of March, 1920, and on divers days thereafter and be-
fore the commencement of this motion, casually lost the said . 
goodR and chattels out of its possession, and the same after-
'vards, to-wit: on the day, days, month and year last afore- · 
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said, came into the possession of the defendant by finding. 
Yet the said defendant. well kno,ving the last mentioned 
standing Trees, felled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, 
rries, Posts, G-oods and Chattels to be the property of the 
said plaintiff and of right to belong and appertain to it, hath 
not as yet delivered the said last mentioned goods. and chat-
tels, or any or either of them, or any part thereof to the said 
plaintiff, although he w·as afterwards, to-wit: on the day and 
year last aforesaid, and on numerous occasions 
page 5 ~ thereafter requested by the plaintiff so to do, but 
hath hitherto wholly refused and still doth refuse 
so to do, and still doth detain the same from the said plain-
tiff to the damage of the said plaintiff of $2,000.00. 
COUNT 4. 
And for thjs also, to-,vit: that heretofore, to-wit: on the 
first day of 1\{arch, 1920, in the County of Brunswick and 
State of Virginia, and on divers days thereafter, the said 
plaintiff was pos·sessed of said standing Timber, felled Tim-
her~ Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, rries, Posts, Goods and 
Chattels, the same consisth1g of 20,500 feet of Pine Timber; 
530 White Oak Ties ; 65 Red Oak Ties; 52 Hickory Ties; 
and a. quantity of other Timber, all of which 'va.s in and upon 
the premises described in the first Count of this notice; and 
all of w·bieh said standing Timber felled Timber, Logs, Lum-
ber. Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, the said 
plaintiff was lawfully possessed as of its own property. And 
being· so possessed the said plaintiff, afterwards, to-wit: on 
the day and divers days thereafter and before the commence-
ment of tl1is action and year first above mentioned, lost the 
~aid standing· Timber, felled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, 
Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and Chattels, out of their pos-
session, and the same afterwards, to-,vit: on the day and 
dhTers clays 'thereafter, and before the commencemen't of this 
motion and there afterwards were commingled and confused 
by the said defendant with certain other standing Timber, 
felled Timber, Log·s, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, 
Goods and Chattels in the said defendant's possession, and 
the plaintiff's said standing Timber, felled Timber, Logs, 
Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods ru1d Chattels, 
came into tl1e possession of the. defendant by conversion, the 
value of all of which is $2,000.00. 
Yet the said defendant welllmowing the said standing Tim-
ber, felled Timber, Log·s, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ti~s, 
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Posts, Goods and Chattels to be the property of the said 
plaintiff, and of right to belong and appertain to it, but con-
triving and fraudu-lent intending to deceive and de-
page 6 ~ fraud the said plaintiff in this behalf hath not de-
livered to the said plaintiff the said standing Tim-
ber, felled Timber, Logs, Lumber,· Planks, Boards, Ties, 
Posts, Goods and Chattels or any or either of them, or any 
part thereof, although often thereunto requested; and after-
wards, to-,vit: on the day and days and year aforesaid, con-
verted and disposed of the said· standing timber, felled Tim-
ber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, Goods and 
Chattels, to his own use, to the damage of the said phiintiff 
in the sum of $2,000.00. 
COUNT 5 . 
. And for this, to-wit: that heretofore, to-wit: on the first· 
day of March, 1920, in the County of Brunswick and State 
of Virginia, and on divers other da.ys and times between that 
day and the commencement of this action, the said defend-
ant, C. H. Perkinson, with force and arms, broke and entered 
the close of the said plaintiff, Brunswick Land Corpora-
tioll; situated in the said County of Brunswick, and described 
in the first Count above, and then and there forced, broke into, 
cut to· piece_s, damaged and spoiled divers Trees, Timber, 
felled Timber, Logs, Lumber, Planks, Boards, Ties, Posts, 
Goods and Chattels, of the said plaintiff of great value, to-
wit: of the value of $2,000.00, then standing and being in 
the said close; and with feet in walking~ trod down, trampled 
upon, consumed and spoiled the grass, and other herbage of 
·the said plaintiff of great value, to-"rit, of the value of $2,-
000.00 at the time growing and being·; and with divers horses, 
mares, geldings, mules, oxen, cows and she.ep, and also with 
the wheels of divers ca.rts,. 'vagons, and other carriages, 
crushed, tore up, damaged, and spoiled the earch and soil of 
the said close; and also then and there mowed and cut down 
the grass, herbage, and timber of the said plaintiff, to-wit: 
20,500 feet of Pine 'rimber; 530 White Oak Ties·; 65 R-ed Oak 
Ties; 42 Hickory Ties; and a. great quantity of other tim-
ber of great value, to-wit:· of the value of $2,000.00. All 
of which the said defendant took and carried a'vay and con-
·verted and disposed of the same to his own use, all of which 
was done by the said def.endant without leave of 
pa.ge 7 } license and against the will of the said plaintiff for 
a Ion~ space of time, to-wit: from tP,e said first 
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day of March, 1920, hitherto; and the said defendant en-
cumbered the said close and hindered the said plaintiff from 
having the use, benefit and enjoyment thereof, in so large and 
ample a manner as it might and otherwise would have done, 
and other 'vrongs to the said plaintiff, the defendant then 
and there did to the damage of $2,000.00. 
Given under our hands this the 6th da.y of April, 1927. 
BRUNSWICI{ LAND CORPORATION, 
By LORENZA J. HA~IMACI{, Attorney. 
INTERROGATORIES. 
Brunswick Land Corporation, a corporation duly chartered 
and doing business under the Laws of the State of Virginia, 
with its principal office at Lawrenceville, Virginia, hereby 
calls upon C. H. Perkinson to answer, upon oath, the fol-
lowing interrogatories to be used in evidence upon the trial 
of the above styled cause: 
First. 
(a) How many feet of Tim her or Lumber did C. H. Per-
kinson, his agents, servants, factors, or employees cut or 
cause to be cut subsequent to ~larch 1st, 1920, from that cer-
tain tract or parcel of land lying and being in Sturgeon ~fag­
isterial District, Brunswick County, Virginia, and Belfield 
~Iagisterial District, Greensvelle County, Virginia, contain-
ing- 511:% acres, more or less, known as the "Bingham Tract", 
and being the same land conveyed to Bruns,vick Land Corpo-
·ration by deed of W. T. Harding and wife, dated }.!larch 19th, 
1919, and of record in the Clerk's Office of Brunswick County 
"'\i""irginia., in Deed Book 71 at page 293. 
(b) State the size, the quality and quantity of each and 
e\rery kind of Timber or Lumber so cut, subsequent to the 
time aforesaid. 
Second. 
page 8 ~ (a) Ho'v many feet of Timber or Lumber l1as the 
said C. H. Perkinson, his a.gents, servants, factors 
or employees, sawed or caused to be sawed subsequent to the 
time aforesaid on the said tract of land described above~ 
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(:.b) State the size, quality, and quantity of each and every 
kind of Timber or Lumber so sawed subsequent to the time 
aforesaid; that is, ho'v many feet of Pine; how mariy white 
oak ties ; how many red oak ties; ho'v many hickory ties ; and 
into what sizes sawed; and whether first or second class stock, 
and how many of each. 
Third . 
. (a) How many feet of Timber or Lumber has the said C. 
H. Perkinson, his agents, servants, factors or employees re-
moved or caused to be removed from the said tract of land 
described above 7 
(b) State the size, the quality and quantity of each and 
every kind of Timber or Lumber so removed, or caused to be 
removed, subsequent to the time aforesaid. That is, how 
many feet of pine; how many white oak ties ; how many red 
oak ties; how many hickory ties; and· other variety of tim-
ber so removed, and whether first or second class stock, and 
how much of each. 
Fourth. 
(a) How many feet of Timber did the said C. H. Perkinson 
his agents, servants, factors or employees sell or cause to b~ 
sold from the tract of land above described, subsequent to the 
time aforesaid? 
(b) State the size. and quality and quantity of each and 
every kind of timber or lumber so sold or caused to be sold 
subsequent to the time aforesaid. That is, how 
page 9 } many feet of pine; how many white oak ties; how 
many . red oak ties ; how many hickory ties; and 
other variety of trees so sold. 
(c) State the price per thousand feet obtained for the 
pine·; the price per tie received for 'vl1ite oak ties; the price. 
per tie received for red oak ties; the price per tie received for 
hickory ties; and the price obtained for any other variety of 
timber sold bv the said C. H. Perkinson from the lands afore-
said. · • 
BRUNSWICI{ I.~AND CORPORATION, 
By LORENZA J. HAMMAC!(, Attorney. 
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ANSWER' TO INTERROGATORIES .. 
In the matter of the interrogatories filed in said Court by 
the said Plaintiff on the 6th day of April, 1927, the said de-
fendant, for answer thereto, answering says: 
1. The defendant relies upon' the plea. of the Statute of 
I.1imitations this day filed by him in said case. 
2. Should the said interrogatories be deemed by the Court 
to be relevant, notwithstanding the said plea of the Statute 
of Limitations, said defendant says, it is a matter of record 
that the plaintiff purchased from W. T. Harding and wife, 
on March 19th, 1919, tl1e tract of land said to contai~1 511% 
acres referred to in these interrogatories· a.s the Bingham 
Tract, and that on April 5th, 1919, the defendant purcha.sed 
an adjoining tract of land said to contain 375 2/3 acres. 
Sl1ortly after said defendant ptuchased said tract of land 
containing 375 2/3 acres, be commenced cutting the timber 
thereon. In the cause of Bn1nswick Land Corporation versus 
C. II. Perkinson and Irene 1\f. Perkinson, insti-
page 10 ~ tuted in this Court on the 6th day of June, 1922, 
the said Brunswick Land Corporation. claimed that 
shortly after April 5th, 1919, said C. H. Perkinson and Irene 
M. Perkinson ''cut over the line to the Bingham tract". In 
that case, which was l1rought under section 5490 of the Code 
to establish the boundary, it was finally held by the Supereme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia that the true boundary of sa.id 
Bingham Tract wa.s·located at a point between the line claimed 
by said Brunswick-Corporation and the line .claimed by said 
Perkinson. And now specifically answering FIRST INTER-
ROGATOR.Y (a) This defendant says that he kept no account 
of tl1e number of feet of timber or lumber cut shortly subse-
quent to April 5, 1919, on the said strip {)f land "rlrich the 
Court held to be the property of said plaintiff, but that the 
same was treated as timber or lumber cut from the tract of 
land containing 375 2/3 acres admittedly belonging to said 
defendant. 
(b) For the reason stated above, this defendant is unable 
to -sta.te the size, the quality or quantity of every kind of 
timber or lumber so cut on the said strip of land. 
(e) Tl1is defendant av-ers that, even is these interrogatories. 
are held to be relevant, the true measure of damages is the 
value of said strip of land immediately before the trees were 
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cut and its value immediately afte.r said trees were cut, and 
that so far as this interrogatory seeks information in regard 
to mauu\actured lumber, it is impertinent and irrelevant. 
This defendant avers that some of the trees on 
page 11 } said strip wei·e cut by B. C. Brown and vV. W. 
Doyle prior to April 5th, 1919'; that other trees on 
said strip were cut by vV esson and Palmer, the grantees from 
Brunswick Land Corporation, and that other trees on said 
strip 'vere cut by trespassers. This defendant avers that he 
cut over a very small portion of the strip which the Court 
awarded to the Plaintiff in the suit above mentioned. 
SECOND INTERROGATORY (a) and (b). This inter-
rogatory, if relevant, is fully answered by the answer to the 
:first interrogatory~ 
TIITRD INTERROGATORY (a) and (b). This interroga-
tory, if relevant, is fully ans,vered by the answer to the first 
interrogatory. 
FOURTH INTERROGATORY (a), {b) and (c). Ahis in-
terrogatory, if relevant, is fully ans,vered by the answer to 
the first interrogatory. 
C. H. PERKINSON. 
April 12th, 1927. 
State of Virginia, 
City of Petersburg, To-,vit: 
I, ~label Hatchett, a Notary Public in and for the City of 
Petersburg, in the State of Virginia, do hereby certify that 
C. H. Perkinson, whose name is signed to the foregoing an-
swers to interrogatories, dated April 12th, 1927, this day 
personally appeared before me, in my city aforesaid, and 
made oath that the statements therein contained are true. 
~iy commission expires on the 1 day of October, 1927. 
Given under my hand this 12 day of April, 1927. 
MABEL HATCHETT, 
Notary Public. 
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page 12 ~ PLEA. OF NOT GUILTY (NO. 1). 
And the said defendant, by his attorney, comes onnd says 
that he is not guilty of .the said premises laid to his charge, 
in manner and form as the said plaintiff·hath above thereof 
complained. And of this the said ·defendant puts himself 
upon the country. 
CHARLES T. LASSITER, p. d. 
PLEA OF NOT GUILTY (No .. 2). 
And the said defendant, by his attorney, ·comes and says 
that he is not guilty of the said several trespasses above laid 
to his charge, or any part thereof, in marnl.er· and form as the 
said plaintiff hath above thereof complained. And of this 
the said defendant puts himself upo~ the country. 
CHARELS T. LASSITER, p. d. 
SPECIAL PLEA OE .. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
And the said defendant, by his attorney, comes and says 
that the supposed cause of action in the notice of motion for 
;judgm.ent mentioned did not accrue to the said plaintiff at 
any time within five years next before the commencement of 
this action in manner and form as the ·said plaintiff hath 
above complained against him, and this the said defendant 
is ready to veri!Y· 
CHARELS T. LASSITER, p. d. 
REPLIOA~riON TO DEFENDANT'S PLEA OF THE· 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
The sai({ plaintiff comes and says that prior to the 5th day 
of June, 1922, plaintiff and defendant were adjacent land 
owners in Brunswick County, Virginia; That the defendant 
crossed over the ~ine and cut from the plaintiff's land the tim-
ber mentione~ in the notice of motion in this proceeding; 
· that upon demand for payment the said defend-
page 13 ~ ant denied having crossed the ·line, and entered 
the premises of p1aintiff; 
That, thereupon, on the 5th day of June, 1922, plaintiff in-
stituted a proceeding in the Circuit Court for Brunswick 
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County, Vlrginia, by petition pursuant to Section 5490 of the 
Code of Virginia, for the purpose .O!f having the true boundary 
line between the plaintiff and defendant determined and as-
·certained ; 
That defendant, in his grounds of defense to the ·said peti-
tion, denied that plaintiff had any legal title to the property 
claimed by the plaintiff and adjoining the lands of the said 
defendant~ 
That on the 7th day of March, 1924, upon •a trial of the 
said cause before the Circuit Court for Brunswick County, 
Virginia, a jury rendered a verdict in the said ·cause estab-
lishing the said line between plaintiff and defendant, in ac-
cordance with the contention of plaintiff; 
. That, thereafter, to-wit, on the 7th· day of May, 1924, the 
Circuit Court for Brunswick County, Virginia, set aside and 
annulled the verdict <:>f the said jury, and entered up final 
judgment for the defendant, thereby sustaining the conten-
tion and .de£ense of the defendant in said proceeding, to the 
effect that plaintiff had no legal and valid title to the land 
from which the said timber had been cut; 
·Thai, thereafter, to-wit, .on the 4th .day of August, 1924, the 
Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia granted a ·writ of er-
ror and a·warded a sztpe1·sedeas to the judgment of the Circuit 
Court far Bxunsw:ick :Couruty, Viirginia, as aforesaid, ren-
dered on the 7th .day t'}ff May, i1924; 
.And, :thet,eatfter, .t0--:wit, on the 30th rilay ;of April, !926 the 
Special Court of Appeals of Virginia, upon a hearing of the 
said ;writ .of er,ror, .reversed .the judgment of the Circuit ,Qourt 
· for Brtnls'-v.icik 1Gounty, ·Virginia, .and .Fema:nded :the said c.ause 
to the iCir.cuit ~Court for Brunswick ·Qounrty, Virgh1.~a., with 
direction to enter up a. judgment in accordance 
page 14l with ~the verdict .of the jury, thereby holding that 
the said plaintiff had a !legal title to the said premi-
ses· 
·That .imme~iately ·after rthe ·rendition -of the judgment of 
the Specia:l Court of Appeals ~of Virginia, as .aforesaid, im-
mediate demands 'vere again ·made upon the said C. H. Per-
kinson for payment for the timber -,vhioh he had wrongfully 
cut and ta:ken from the .premises of the _plaintiff ; 
That negotiations for settlement pended until on or about 
the '7th day of April, 1927, when plaintiff instituted this ac-
tion in order to recover for the timber, as aforesaid; And 
that the said plaintiff brought this action within five (5) years 
after the rendition of the judgment of the Special Court of 
Appeals of Virginia, as aforesaid, and 'vithin five (5) years 
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ses, excluding the period from May 7th, 1924, until the 30th 
from the time the timber \Vas cut and taken from the prem.i-
day of April, 1926; 
And t~is the said plaintiff is ready to verify. 
LORENZO J. H.AJ\fMACI(, p. q. 
STATE~IENT OF FACTS AGREE·D UPON. 
It is agreed that if the Statute of Limitations commenced 
to run upon the completion of the ·cutting and removal of the· 
timber, and ran continuously from that date, with no interrup- · 
tions or suspensions, then the cause was barred upon the in-
stitution of the notice of motion. . 
Action under #5490 instituted June 5, 1922, final judgment 
of Circuit Court thereupon May 7, 1924, and final judgment on 
appeal of plaintiff in Special Court of Appeals April 30, 
1926; In other 'vords the plaintiff claims that either 
1. The statute of ·limitations was suspended in regard to 
a claim for damages by the bringing of the action under 
#5490; or 
2. It wa.s suspended until the final judgment of the Court 
of Appeals in the action under #5490, 'vhich determined the 
ow~ersl1ip by the plaintiff of the strip of lai1d in dispute; or 
page 15 ~ 3. It ·was suspended behveen the time of the 
:final judgment of the Circuit Court and the final 
judgment of the Court of Appeals in the action under #5490. 
CHARLES T. LASSITE.R. 
L.J.H. 
·The foregoing is a stipulation to· control the judgment of 
the Court, by consent, in order to its final judgment without 
the intervention of a jury in this case, except for "the purpose 
of ascertaining the plaintiff',s damages, if there were such 
damages, and if the defendant were liable for such damages. 
Nov. 21, 1927. 
M. R. PETERSON, ~udge. 
Filed: Nov. 21, 1927. 
M. R. P. 
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And at another day, to:-·wit, at a Circuit Court held for the 
County of Brunswick, on the 28th day of January, 1928, the 
following order was entered: · 
This day came the parties, by their Attorneys, and there-
upon neither party demanding- a jury, the whole matter of 
la'v and fact being submitted to the Court for determina-
tion, without the intervention of a Jury, upon an agreed st.ipu-
la.tio11 l1chveen tl1e. parties, by counsel, 'vith reference to the 
application, force, and effect of the defendant's plea of the 
statute of limitations filed in this case on the 13th day of 
April, 1927, ailong· 'vith certain other pleas in bar; Upon which 
said pleas issue has been duly joined; Ancl the Court, there-
upon, having· heard the arg-ument of counsel, having- duly 
considered tl1e facts recited in the stipulation~ 'vhich is filed 
'vith the records in this case as a. part thereof, and being of 
opinion that the said plea of statute of limitations in view 
of said stipulation, doth operate as a bar to this action; 
It is considered by· tl1e Court, for the reasons stated by 
the Court, in an opinion in ·w-riting which is hereby filed as a 
part of the record herein, that the said plea of the 
page 16.} statute· of limitations be, and the same: is hereby, 
sustained; That this action be accordingly dis-
missed; And that the Frla.inti:ff take nothing by its hill, but be 
in mercy, etr.; A.nd that the defenclant .recover of the plain-
tiff his costs hy him in this behalf expended, to which action 
and judgment of the Court, the plaintiff, by counsel, ex-
cepted; 
And it being suggested to tl1e Conrt that the plaintiff de-
Rires to present to the Supreme Court of Appeals of Vir-
g;inia a petition praying· a writ of er!or to this judgment, it 
iR ordered that exeeution thereof be suspended for a period of 
ninet~? (90) days from this date, upon the plaintiff's enter-
ing- into a bond before the Clerk of this Court in the penalty 
of $50.00, with surety to he approved by said Clerk, 'vith con-
dition reciting· this judgment,. and the ·intention of the plaintiff 
to present such petition, and providing for the payment of 
all such damages as may acerue to any .person, by reason of 
said suspension, in ease a .c;upersedea.s to this judgment should 
not be allowed, ancl he effectual within the time above speci-
fied. 
OPINION OF THE COUR~. 
The present action is a proceeding instituted on April 7, 
1927, by notice of motion to recover damages for a trespass 
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on the plaintiff's land. The damag-es claimed represent the 
estimated value· of certain timber cut and removed by the de-
fendant, the undergrowth destroyed, and consequential injury 
to the. freehold, etc. 
As stipulat~d by the agreement of counsel, the primary 
question tn the case arises upon the defendant's plea of the 
statute of limitation, the decision of which is referred to the 
court upon the facts agreed. . . 
On tTnne 5, 1922, the plainti·ff filed in this court a petition 
under Section 5490 of the Code, to 'vbich the defendant w·as 
made the adverse party, seeking to have determined the 
boundary htween ~ertain lands c~aimed by the 
page 17 ~ plaintiff and rertain adjacent lands claimed by the 
defendant. 'l'he real controversy between the par-
ties 'vas as to their relative rigl1ts to a small intermediate 
location to \V"hicl1 eac.h asserted the right of possession. On 
~lay 7th 1924, judgment was rendet·ed in favor of the de-
fendant, by wl1ich the plaintiff's clajm to the right of pos-
session of the parcel in question was denied, and by \Vhich 
this small parcol "ras in effect awarded to the defendant. 
On the 4th day of· Aug11st, 1924, the plai~tiff filed its peti-
tion in the Supreme Court of .... <\.ppeals an~ obtained a. writ 
of error and S1tpersedea.s to this judgment. On April 30th, 
1926, by an order entered in the Special Court of Appeals, 
the judgment of the Circuit Court w·as reversed, and final 
judgment entere~ for the plaintiff. The result was, q1wad 
the defendant, to affirm the plaintiff's claim of o'\vnership to 
the debatable area. 
If any trespass were committed by the defendant, as al-
leged in the notiee of motion here, such trespass consisted in 
the cutting and removal of tJmber trees on the parcel of land 
in controversy in the first instance,-before the institution of 
the proceeding under section 5490 to determine the common 
boundary line. 
The stipulation between the. parties is as follows: 
''It is agreed that if the Statute of Limitations commenced 
to run upon tl1e eompletion of the cutting- and removal of 
t.he timber and ran continually from that date, '\\-ith no in-
terruptions or suspensions then the cause \vas barred upon 
the institution of the notice of motion. Under Section 5490, 
.Juno 5th, 1922, ~final judgment of the Circuit thereupon ~fay 
7th, 1924, and final judgment on appeal of. plaintiff in Special 
Court of Api>eals April 30th, 1926.'' 
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"In other 'vords the plaintiff claims that either: 
'' 1. The statute of limitations was suspended in regard to 
a claim for damages by the bringing· of the action under 
Section 5490 ; or 
"2. It 'vas suspended until the final judgment Qf the court 
·of appeals in the action under Section 54'90, which determined 
the ownership by the plaintiff of the strip of land in dispute; 
or 
'' 3. It was suspended between the times of the final judg-
ment of the Circuit Court and the final judgment of the court 
of appeals. in the .action under section 5490. '' 
page 18 ~ The question therefore, stated specifically and 
·in its strictest terms is whether the Statute of 
Limit.a tions began to run from the time 'vhen the trees were 
cut by the defendant, :that is, at sometime prior to the com-
mencement of the proceeding under sec. 5490, or only from 
the time 'vhen the plaintiff's claim to the ,locus in .. quo was 
finally determined in the final outcon;te of this proceeding, 
t.he course of which has been set forth; and, again, if the 
Statute began to run from the time of the commission of the 
trespass, whether the institution of the proceeding under 
section 5490, or the subsequent proceeding in the appellate 
court, tolled or suspended its operation lintil the final deter-
mination of that proceeding. 
In other words, stating .the question broadly with refer-
nnce to principle, 'vha.t effect, if any, does the pro·ceeding 
under section 5490 have in respect to application of the stat-
ute pleaded hore by the defendant in bar of the plaintiff's 
action? 
It is well settled, and needs the citation of no authority 
to that effect, that the statute. begins to run when the r.ight 
of actions accrues. It is equally 'veH settled that in its terms 
the statute is absolute, admitting of no exception which it-
self does 11ot recognize, unless under certain extraordinary 
circumstances, wherein the posit.ive and plain requirements 
of an equitable estoppel preclude its application. For in-
stance, the pendency of a suit to enforce a right of action, 
ho,vever, long protracted, suspends its effect. This, of 
course, is obvious. It is also held that the defendant, who 
has by affirmative act deprived -the plaintiff of his power 
to assert his cause of action in due season, as by process of 
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injunction, will not be permitted to avail himself of the Stat-
:ute when this obstruction to the plaintiff's action shall have 
been at le:o.gth removed. These qualifications of the statute 
are, it may be. observed, implicit in the general la,v, a.nd are 
independent of the. exceptions to. its operation, which the stat-
ute itself declares. 
page 19 ~ · For the effect of an injunction see ........... . 
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At 'vhat precise time, the cause of action is to be deemed 
to have accrued presents not infrequently a question of nice 
discrimination between the event creating, or giving 'rise 
per se, to the cause of action and the event 'vhich merely re-
cognizes and ascertains tl1e existence of a cause of action pre-
viously exj sting. 
This distinction is. not so subtle, hc;nvever, as might ap-
pear. It is a distinction with a differmice, and of the first 
importance in some instances. · 
For example, it is generally allowed that when a person 
aoZore officii, as we should say, or in pursuance of a bona fide 
claim of right, assumes to exercise the powers of a pubZice of-
fice .from which in due course he is subsequently ·ousted~ in 
consequence of a. legal proceeding against him by another 
claimant whose legal title to the office is 'successfully estab-
lished, the statute begins to n1n from the judgment of the 
court annulling the pretensions of the incumbent, and de-
priving him of its perquisites. In an action, therefore, by 
the succesafnl, competitor in such litigation to recover of 
·the previous incumbent the emoluments received by him dur-
ing his occupancy of the place, the statute begins to run, not 
from the date of the receipt by him of these emoluments, but 
from the date of the judgment in the proceeding wherein the 
title to the office was determined. The controversy in such 
a case is between the de facto officer and the officer de j1f.re, 
not one between a de ,i-z1-re officer and a mere intruder or 
usurper. The judgment of the court thus does more . than 
simply ~seertain or recognize and (lin, already existing right, 
In the deciding behveen the rival claimants, tl1e court founds 
the claim of the successful candidate or competitor for the 
first time upon a legal lJasis. ~t thus by its judgment cre-
ates the right to demand the benefits of the office, w·hich 
otherwise could never have been asserted against the officer 
de faof.o. Such seems to be the reasoning of the case, 'vhich 
bas been cited, and cases of similar import. 
Brunswick Land Corporation v. C. H. Perlcinson. 2? 
Another class of cases illustrates the principle 
page 20} that pending certain disability to prosecute an 
. action, the statut-e is tolled. But neither mere dif-
ficulty nor inconvenience in seeking a legal remedy, nor the 
fact that a cognate question may be involved in an inde-
pendent pr.oceeding between the parties, will frustrate the 
plea of the statute after the lapse of the prescribed priod. 
lla;niel v. Rope1·, 24th Ark., page 131, exemplifies this ·doc-
trine. A woman who had been held in servitude on the theory 
that she lacked the qualifications of a free woman eventually 
obtained .her freedom by the judgment of a competent court 
in a proper proceeding. · She thereupon brought an action 
against her oppressor for the conversion of certain of her 
personal effetcts, appropriated by the defendant while she 
was· held by him in durance. To this action, the defendant 
opposed a plea of the statute. A bill in chancery by which 
she sought to enjoin this plea was dismissed on the ground 
that it had been always competent for her to assert her prop-
erty in these effects by sui~table action, and that her right 
to sue for the recovery of her personrul property was, con-
trary to her contention, not dependent upon the establish-
ment by her of her right to freedom. The restraint upon 
her liberty was not of itself a legal disability, and, for all 
that appeared, she could have enforced her right of property 
a.t any time as in fact she had enforced her right to liberty 
of person. 
In Bakm· v. Boozer, 58 Ga. 195, t11ere appears a very close 
approximation in fact and in principal to the case at bar. A 
sheriff levied and sold under fi fa certain effects as the prop-
erty of the .execution debtor, afterwards, the true owner, as 
claimant under the Georgia statute, in a proper proceeding 
against tho sl1eriff recovered possession of his property, 
and subsequently broug-ht his action against the sheriff for 
damages sustained by him in consequence of the seizure of his 
goods. It 'vas held that the sta.tute wa.s not tolled, while his 
action t.o recover the property was pending. Says the opin-
ion in brief: 
page 21 } '' ~ $: * the right of action accrues at the 
time of the seizure, and the suit must be com-
menced within four years thereafter, or it will be .barred.'' 
''The owner of the property cannot change the period of 
limitation by interposing a cla.im, litigating the right of prop-
erty in that case, and treating his damages as not sustained 
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until the claim case has been determined in his favor * • * 
* * * if these damages were sufficiently proximate to · 
be recover&ble the reasonable and probable amount of the 
same might have been anticipated without waiting for the 
claim case to be brought to a conclusion before commen.cing 
an action for the trespass. But the claim was a suit com-
menced by the claimant, and that circumstance would seem 
to embarrass greatly the theory on 'vhich the present action 
is founded. There is a provision of la:w for assessing dam-
ages against the claimant, but none for awarding them in his 
favor.'' 
In order that the time during which a former action while 
pending mav be available in repelling the statute in a subse-
quent case between the parties it acoordingly a.ppearJS that 
the cause of action in the two cases must be substantially iden-
tical. Tl1e Virg-inia court has evident reference to the true 
doctrine when it declared in Nelson v. Tr·iplett, 99 Va., p. 
425: 
''Appellee unsuccessful action of ejectment led to no change 
in the possession of the land, and did not stop the running 
of the statute of limitations.'' 
citing IT' ood1nan v. G·uthrie,. 29 Penn. State 495. 
Quite a different case would be presented here had the de-
lay in instituting the action for damages been due to the act 
of the defendant in staying or suspending the execution of 
a judgment in the nisi prius court in favor of the plaintiff and 
pending the prosecution of an appeal by the defendant as the 
losing party, had sueh been tl1e case. Clearly in that event, 
the statute would not have run against the plaintiff's judg-
ment until his judgment became effective upon the final dis-
position of the writ of error; but it is a judgment in favor of 
the defendant from 'vhich the appeal was taken, the affirmance 
of which by the appellate court would have operated to sus-
pend the statute for his benefit in any subsequent action on his 
behalf in virtue of his judgment in the circuit court against 
the plaintiff. 
In fine, the plaintiff's action to try the rigl1t of possession 
by means of its petition under section 5490 was not 
page 22· ~ incompatible with a concomitant action by it for 
the defendant's ~res pass. Had it chosen eject-
ment as its remedy, it migl1t have claimed -such damages in 
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that action. V. C. 5481. At all events, it oould have brought 
the independent action for the tort. But section 5490 makes 
no provision for the incidental ascertai~ent of the plain-
tiff's damages unless the defendant, after the final judgment 
against him, should file a speciail petition under chapter 225 
of the Code, as was not the case. The gist of the matter 
is that the plaintiff's right of possession was declared by 
the judgment of the Special Court of Appeals in a specific 
proceeding limited to a particular object-the determination 
of a common boundary. The plaintiff might, in addition, by 
an action of trespass, or on the case, have also sought dam-
ages for the defendant's antecedent trespass. It elected to 
embrace the o~e, but not the other, remedy. Failing in its 
object in the former proceeding, it might, possibly have 
failed in the latter, as success in the former augured suc-
cess in the latter. It might naturally have thought to avoid 
a speculation on the event of the proceeding to determine 
the boundary, and rather to await the issue of that case before 
undertaking its action·for damages, neverthelss, this is merely 
another form of the argument ·ab inconvenienti. A suffi-
cient answer to the argument here is that without resorting 
at the time to any possessory action, it might forthwith 
have brought its action for the tort, and have successfully 
maintained it on evidence, perhaps less. cogent than that 
necessary to establish its claim of title i~ fee simple to the 
premises. In other words, its claim to the right of posses-
sion of the land in dispute, while related to its claim for 
damag-es for the defendant's trespass, constitutes a distinct 
and independent subject of action. An observation in the 
opinion of the court in Baker v. Booz·er, su.pra, would seem 
no less pertinent here in the analogy of the circumstances ; · 
page 23 }- · "But the ·claim was a sujt commenced by the 
claimant, a.nd that circumstance would seem to 
embarrass g-reatly the theory on which the present action is 
founded. There is a provision of law for assessing damages 
against the claimant, but none for awarding them in his 
favor." 
Likewise. under section 5490 of the Code, there is a provis-
ion of law for assessing damages against the petitioner, under 
the provisions of chapter 225 of the Code, but none for 
awarding them in his favor-none, at least, until the defend-
ant divested of the possession of any property in such a. pro-
ceeding shall have first asserted his claim for improvements. 
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I am hence of opinion that the defendant's plea of the stat-
ute of limitations is a sufficient defense to the plaintiff's 
claim, and will enter judgment accordingly. 
M. R. PETE·RSON, Judge. 
January 28, 1928. 
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